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ABSTRACT

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act –commonly known as the Superfund act-- was passed
by Congress in 1980, in the aftermath of toxic waste disasters such as
that in Love Canal, NY. CERCLA not only required that major
corporations take responsibility for cleaning up their dangerous
disposal or accidental release of toxic waste into the public, but it also
created a trust fund to cover instances where a responsible party could
not be found or went bankrupt. This “superfund” was financed by taxes
on pollutant-producing companies.
However, these taxes expired in 1995, and the Republican
controlled congress blocked efforts to renew them. The trust fund ran
out in 2003, and since then CERCLA sites have relied on congressional
allocation and approval for funding, severely hindering recovery efforts
under Superfund.Even before the halt on pollutant taxes, CERCLA was
underutilized, and cleanup efforts were often slow or excessively
delayed. With the absence of a superfund for sites of contested or
unattributed responsibility, more and more sites were left untreated, or
have undergone very slow and incomplete restoration processes.
This historical investigation aims to examine both the historical
context of CERCLA, and the Policy principles that both brought
CERCLA into existence, only to doom it to invalidity, in order to
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concretely establish that CERCLA’s failure is solely due to a lack of
proper execution and support on the federal level. Furthermore, this
investigation will also examine the methodology by which the National
Priority List for superfund sites are ranked and thusly addressed, and
will consider the ethical and economic implications of this system, and
whether it discriminates against lower income regions in its
prioritization process.
It becomes evident through this investigation, then, that CERCLA
itself is not a badly designed piece of legislation. In fact, if properly
funded, enforced, and with minimal overhaul to the prioritization
process, CERCLA could be the incredibly effective program it was
intended to be, rather than the helpful but limited capacities of the law
in its current form. The solution, thus, is an obvious one, but it is the
only effective and just option: the superfund needs to be replenished
through the reinstatement of CERCLA taxes on polluting petroleum
and chemical companies, and EPA funding needs to be increased or
redistributed in order to provide the extra necessary resources to help
expedite the cleanup process, and thusly correct the negligent inaction
that has harmed thousands of U.S. citizens living near untreated
superfund sites in the past decade.
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INTRODUCTION
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act is was, at its passage in 1980, the most ambitious piece of
Environmental Legislation in American history. Coming about as a
direct response to the toxic waste catastrophes of the 1970s such as the
one that took place in in Love Canal, NY, CERCLA – or, as it is
commonly known, the Superfund act-- held corporations and other
waste-producing entities responsible for toxic waste crises caused by
their own emissions or disposal, but just as importantly it created a
trust fund that ensured cleanup and reclamation would occur in areas
affected by toxic waste disasters even if no responsible party could be
found12.While the majority (70%)3 of waste-related disasters are able to
be charged to the responsible party, the remaining 30% were, until
1995, financed by the titular “superfund”-- a pool of capital generated
by taxes on petroleum and chemical feedstacks.
In 1995, however, these taxes on pollutant-emitting substance
producers expired, and the Clinton administration failed to generate
1

Beck, Eckardt C. “The Love Canal Tragedy”. EPA Journal, January 1979.
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.html
2
Collin, Robert W. The Environmental Protection Agency: Cleaning Up America’s Act.
Greenwood Press, Westport CT, 2006. P29
3
“Superfund Enforcement: Success in Enhancing Fairness and Expediting Settlements”.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency;
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/accomp/17yrrept/report3.htm. “The Enforcement First strategy
holds that the PRPs bear the responsibility and cleanup cost of the sites they polluted. The
implementation of this strategy has assured responsible parties perform a majority of cleanups
(approximately 70%), saving the taxpayers billions of dollars. The Enforcement First strategy has
also been responsible for replenishing the Superfund trust fund, so cleanups can continue at
abandoned and time-critical sites. This strategy has been a strong deterrent to potential future
hazardous waste dumping because it establishes a real threat that polluters will be found and
punished.”
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the requisite support for renewal. The resources generated by the taxes
did leave a pool of useable Superfund finances that lasted until 2003.
Since then, there has been no Superfund to actually use for CERCLA-instead, disasters which have no responsible parties burdening the cost
are forced to apply to congress for special funding, and are as a result
left to the partisan whims of the legislature, and at best can expect to
wait through a crowded and slow legislative schedule to receive
funding to clean up emergencies that are often time-sensitive in their
response.
CERCLA has, as a result, come to be seen as somewhat of a noble
failure, but how apt is this perception? Has CERCLA truly failed as a
piece of environmental legislation, and if so is it the fault of the law
itself, or is it the due to the way the law was implemented and
summarily neglected? After a thorough investigation into the law itself,
its historical context, and and data regarding its implementation, it
becomes clear that while CERCLA is not responsible for its own failure,
even if some compromises and lack of foresight did hamper its
effectiveness in some respects. Rather, it becomes damningly clear that
the legislation has never been properly enforced or implemented at any
point in its nearly thirty-three year history.
CERCLA’s very lax enforcement in its infancy under the Reagan
administration set a precedent for under-implementation, and the
Congress' decision to cease taxation funding of the CERCLA trust
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Superfund not only hampered the effectiveness of CERCLA in the past
decade, it also undermines the entire ethos of environmental
accountability and the polluter pays principle that formed the impetus
for the very passage of the Superfund act. By delegating response and
allocation powers to Congress for unclaimed superfund sites, it
becomes incredibly difficult-- and often impossible-- for the federal
government to adequately and promptly respond to toxic waste
disasters. It also places the burden of financing these reclamation and
cleanup projects on taxpayers-- an immense injustice, considering
these are the same taxpayers who are victimized by such toxic waste
disasters in the first place.
Furthermore, knowledge of this burden also has caused congress to
be reluctant to allocate full funding or any funding at all in these
unclaimed cases, and as a result, the victimized regions fail to receive
the aid and recovery assistance they deserve. This inability to properly
respond to toxic waste disaster sites in a timely manner has created an
implicit system of regional and socioeconomic bias in the cleanup
implementation process. However it becomes difficult to determine
whether such biases are inherent to the structure of the Superfund’s
National Priority List for sites, or whether it is simply due to the
inherent bias endemic to American governance against lower
socioeconomic

areas

in

regards

infrastructural reform and support.

to

the

implementation

of
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In order to properly understand the way in which CERCLA’s
implementation was such a betrayal of its intentions, it is critical that
we examine the historical context of its creation-- as the apex of a
decade of environmental reform, and as a direct response to the toxic
waste tragedy in Love Canal, NY.

THE HISTORY OF CERCLA
Background
The 1970’s were a tumultuous time in American History, but they
were marked largely by the Environmentalist movement finally coming
into full, as the United States government under the Nixon, Ford, and
Carter administrations passed a series of groundbreaking regulatory
laws that would shape the impetus of modern environmentalism. As
the 1960’s saw a massive surge in environmental activism, brought on
largely by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and public environmental
catastrophes such as the Cuyahoga River Fire in 1969, the U.S.
government started to slowly respond, before finally taking some
massive steps forward in the new decade. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) was formally established on December 2nd,
1970, marking the creation of the first government institution solely
devoted to addressing environmental concerns1. It was followed by the
passage of a series of highly successful and comprehensive regulatory
1

“EPA History”. United States Environmental Protection Agency.
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history
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laws, such as the Clean Air Act of 19701, The Clean Water acts of 1972
and 19772, the Ocean Dumping Act of 19723,the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 19764, and the Toxic Substances Control Act of
19765, all of which were coupled by an increased public and media
awareness of environmental disasters. However, the most high-profile
environmental disaster of the decade would not be a fire or cataclysmic
spill, but rather the discovery of years of deception and neglect that put
an entire community at risk.
Love Canal
Love Canal, NY, was a small town in Upstate New York, a
community full of young families that, ironically, lacked its titular
canal. Founded in the early 1900s with the intent of using a canal
between the upper and lower Niagara rivers to provide power to a
veritable dream community.6 However, his efforts only shortly
preceded the advent of the alternating current as a cheap and simple
means of carrying electricity over long-distance wires, and by the
1920’s, the canal’s primary use was as a chemical and industrial
dumping site7.

1

EPA History”. United States Environmental Protection Agency.
http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history
2
See Above
3
See Above
4
See above
5
See Above
6
Beck, Eckhart C. “The Love Canal Tragedy”. EPA Journal, 1979.
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.html
7
Beck
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The largest contributor to this landfill --by a large margin-- was
Hooker Chemical Corporation, using the site to bury waste from 1942
until 19541. By this time, “200 different chemicals and a total of 22,000
tons of waste had been dumped into the canal, including some of the
most

toxic

substances

ever

devised:

dioxin,

polychlorinated

biphenyls...and multiple solvents and pesticides.”2 The hazardous
waste was buried in metal drums, which were prone to breaking open
upon being dumped, while other waste was dumped directly into the
canal3. Meanwhile, Hooker Chemical left the site unguarded and
without a fence, allowing children to play in the area even against the
recommendations of its own internal advisory council4.
The Niagara Falls school board approached Hooker Chemical
with the request to purchase a portion of the property under which this
waste was buried, and in 1953, Hooker Chemical effectively donated
the land to the school board for the price of one dollar5. The
stipulations of the sale required the school board to take the entirety of
the land, and it served to “indemnify Hooker against all liability...[and
Hooker] retained dumping rights until the school was built.”6 While
Hooker acknowledged the site had been used for chemical dumping, it
did not mention the potential toxicity of these substances to the school
1

Mazur, Alan. A Hazardous Inquiry: The Rashomon Effect at Love Canal. The President
and Fellows at Harvard College, 1998. P8
2
Magoc, Chris J. Environmental Issues in American History: A Reference Guide with
Primary Documents. Greenwood Press, Westport CT, 2006. P248
3
Magoc, P248
4
Magoc, P248
5
Magoc, P248 and Beck;
6
Magoc, 248
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board. The elementary school was finished in 1955, located right by the
canal, and almost immediately, residents began to, “complain about
children being burnt, nauseous odors, and black sludge...but nothing
was done... the State finally begun to investigate... in the spring of
1978.”1 Health problems ranged from skin rashes to respiratory
conditions, but the only response by Niagara Falls government officials
was to further cover the waste with clay2.
Lois Marie Gibbs, a young mother who had moved to Love Canal
with her two children in 1972, would become one of the first leaders of
the grassroots movement amongst Love Canal residents to get the state
to investigate and address their concerns, after her son attending the
elementary school built on the dump site developed epilepsy without
any family history of the condition3. Gibbs launched a massive petition
drive, and when the New York State Department of Health finally
conceded and released their analysis in spring 1978, it declared the
canal “an extremely serious threat to the health and welfare of
residents”4. NSDOH Commissioner Robert Whalen declared a state of
emergency in Love Canal on August 2nd, 19785, the 99th Street School
was closed, and a recommended evacuation order was put in place for
parents and children under the age of two in love canal. When town

1

Gibbs, Lois Marie, with Murray Levine. Love Canal: My Story. State University of New
York Press, Albany,1982. P3-4
2
Magoc 249
3
Gibbs 9-11
4
Magoc 249-250
5
Magoc 250 and Beck

Borenstein 12
residents found the two-year old age limit arbitrary, the order was
extended to all 239 families in close proximity to the site, and President
Carter signed a federal disaster order to provide emergency funding for
their relocation1, and on August 7 of that year, the New York state
government announced it would purchase homes affected by chemicals
from residents of Love Canal.2
More than 600 homes, however, fell outside of this evacuation
range. Gibbs worked with cancer researcher Dr. Beverly Paigen, who
led an additional survey of residents that found an unsettlingly high
rate of birth defects, illness, and miscarriage rates in remaining
residents3. The State health department, as a result, issued a second
evacuation order in 1979. Below is a map of the school and surrounding
neighborhood, with evacuation zones indicated4:

1

Magoc 250
Beck
3
Magoc 250
4
Blum, Elizabeth D. Love Canal Revisited: Race, Class, and Gender in Environmental
Activism.University of Kansas Press, 2008.P10. Footnote applies to image on the next
page
2
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A majority of Love Canal residents, however, were still left behind,
but by 1980, President Carter had signed an order funding the
permanent relocation of all Love Canal residents who wished to
evacuate-- only sixty seven residents stayed behind.1 As reports of
health problems continued filing in, more than 800 lawsuits were filed
against Hooker Chemical, the county, the board of education, and the
city of Love Canal, while the U.S. government filed a suit itself against
Hooker, with the ensuing legal battle lasting more than a decade2.The
incident, however, was a major public event, dominating front-page
news coverage and bringing the dangers of such undisclosed and
improperly managed toxic waste sites to national attention. Soon,
stories of similar incidents around the nation began receiving
attention, and there was substantial public pressure for the federal
government to address these issues.
Multiple bills appeared in both chambers of Congress, calling for
legal accountability and liability for companies whose toxic waste
disposal endangered communities in the United States. Love Canal
turned into a galvanizing turning point.

1
2

Magoc, 250-251
Magoc 250-251
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The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980

“AN ACT To provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and
emergency response for hazardous substances released into the
environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal
sites.”1
CERCLA was preceded by multiple legislative efforts at the end
of the decade to enforce liability for waste disposal cleanup, and as
such, effectively functioned as the composite of four bills put forward
between January of 1979 and December of 1980. The first attempts at
regulating such waste disposal, bill H.R. 852, was groundbreaking for
its attempt to establish funding pools to address instances of oil and
toxic waste spills into navigable bodies of water, as financed by taxes
on the petroleum and toxic waste industries. However, this bill,
introduced in January of 1979, died in committee by that summer,
largely due to significant resistance on the part of opposition by the oil
and chemical industry to the provisions on cleanup liability. Senator
1

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 198042
U.S.C. § 9601 http://www.epw.senate.gov/cercla.pdf
2
Bulan, Lynn A. & Switzer, Carole Stern.“CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act”. American Bar Association, Chicago, IL, 2002.
P6: “The first [bill on which CERCLA was based]. H.R. 85, was introduced on January 15,
1979....never considered by the full house, reportedly due to oil and chemical industry
opposition to the cleanup cost liability provisions.... the bill imposed joint and several strict
liability on the owners and operators of facilities that released any of these substances into
navigable waters, and provided both governmental and private rights of recovery for costs
and injuries. After referral to the Senate, this bill died in the Committee on Environment and
Public Works”
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John Culver of Louisiana similarly introduced a bill that established a
$1.6 billion trust fund for cleanup efforts, larger than any of its
comparable bills, but this bill also focused on waterways, and died at
the subcommittee level1. A similar bill, H.R. 7020, called for an
expansion of this waste liability to all hazardous waste sites, while also
granting the government response authority. H.R. 7020 was put
forward on April 22, 1980, and passed the house in September, only to
similarly die in the senate at the committee level2.
The final bill, which would eventually form the basis for
CERCLA, S. 1480, was introduced on July 11, 1979, and was brought to
the full Senate exactly a year later. S. 1480 established a “$200 million
post-closure liability fund”3, and a $4.085 billion fund for general
cleanups, as funded by fees and appropriations on pollutant and waste
producing companies that were generally responsible for such
incidents4. S. 1480, however, was poised to meet the same resistance
that the other bills had faced, and following the 1980 elections --in
which Carter lost the presidency to Ronald Reagan, and the Democrats
lost control of the Senate-- the lame duck Carter administration and
democratic senate scrambled to find a way to make a bill that would
pass before the end of 1980.

1

Bulan 7
Bulan 6-7
3
Bulan 7
4
Bulan 7
2
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The bill that would form CERCLA was a combination of H.R 7020
and S. 1480, and it established a $1.6 billion trust fund for covering the
costs of cleanup and restoration for toxic waste sites where the
responsible organization could not be found or could not cover the
costs of cleanup, while also establishing legal liability for companies
that could be identifiable as responsible for toxic waste disasters1.
CERCLA also established handling provisions for abandoned or closed
toxic waste sites, along with retroactive liability for companies who had
committed spills even before the passage of CERCLA.
However, the bill could not pass Congress so quickly without some
major additional compromises. Both bills included petroleumproducing companies as liable for any spills or disposal under
CERCLA, which obviously was met with significant opposition from
lobbyists for petroleum companies. The only way CERCLA was able to
quickly pass before the end of the Senate term with the tax on
petroleum-based companies intact (a pivotal aspect of the Superfund,
as taxes on petroleum producers were the biggest contributors to the
trust fund) while still avoiding petroleum lobby resistance was by
including a provision that excluded all crude oil production wastes
from CERCLA eligibility2. CERCLA’s definition of toxic waste, as such,
excludes petroleum, leaving victims of waste sites involving petroleum

1

“CERCLA Overview”. The United States Environmental Protection Agency.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm
2
Collins, Craig. “Toxic Loopholes: Failures and Future Prospects for Environmental Law”.
Cambridge University Press 2010. Cambridge, NY P87
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waste with effectively no legal recourse to demand response. This
clause is the reason that the Exxon-Valdez and BP Gulf Coast Oil spills
of 1989 and 2010, respectively, were not eligible for CERCLA response
funding. Similarly, the only way that the Carter Administration was
able to get CERCLA through Congress in time without resistance was
by striking a clause that would require direct compensation of victims
of toxic waste spills1.
However, in spite of these concessions, CERCLA held onto the
important aspects, for the most part, establishing a standard of
accountability for all toxic waste producing companies in waste
disposal (petroleum excepted, of course), along with creating a
polluting industries tax-financed trust fund to pay for unaccountable
toxic waste sites, thereby taking the cleanup cost away from the
victimized populace regardless of whether or not a company is found
responsible. President Carter signed the act into law on December 11,
1980, with barely more than a month left in his term2.
When President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981,with a
Republican-controlled congress on his side, he instantly initiated an
agenda that aimed to cut regulatory federal programs as much as
possible, and two of his largest targets were the EPA and CERCLA. At
1

Collins, P86: “Carter signed CERCLA in 1980. By the time it reached the president’s
desk, fierce chemical industry lobbying had convinced Congress to strike a provision
compensating the victims of exposure to hazardous spills and dumps. “
2
“CERCLA Overview”. The United States Environmental Protection Agency.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm
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the forefront of Reagan’s deregulatory environmental agenda was his
appointee to head the EPA, Anne Gorsuch. Gorsuch was an
archconservative who was handpicked by a selection committee that
was itself headed by archconservative beer tycoon Joseph Coors, who
was staunchly opposed to the EPA. Coors was drawn to Gorsuch by her
track record in the Colorado legislature, where she prominently fought
toxic waste and auto emissions regulations1. A frequently repeated
anecdote is that Coors, “reportedly chose Gorsuch after she
satisfactorily answered the question: ‘Are you willing to bring the EPA
to its knees?’”2. It was a mission Gorsuch was more than up to: Gorsuch
filled the EPA with appointees that were lobbyists for chemical,
petroleum, automobile, and asbestos companies3, slashed the EPA’s
operating budget by 60 percent, and abolished the EPA’s office of
enforcement, replacing the office with the position of Chief
Enforcement officer-- a position filled by a former Exxon employee
who reported directly to Gorsuch4.
Gorsuch took particular aim at the nascent CERCLA, almost
immediately cutting $55 million from the EPA’s hazardous waste
program5. When Reagan took office in 1981, the EPA, “listed 14,000
sites for priority cleanup and ‘fast tracked’ 114 for immediate action”6 .
1

Collins 90
Collins 90
3
Collins 91, and Collins 102: “A 1993 study found that 80% of the top EPA officials
who worked in the area of hazardous waste after 1980 joined firms involved in
Superfund cleanups”
4
Collins 90
5
Collins 91
6
Collins 91
2
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In 1981, Gorsuch only used $8 million out of $78 million in funding
available for toxic waste site cleanup, and in 1982 only spent $71
million out of $170 million available for the same fund1. In spite of this
complete neglect of the Superfund program, Gorsuch publicly asserted
that she did not believe the program would be necessary after 19852.
The Gorsuch-run EPA was absolutely crippled by Gorsuch’s cutbacks,
and though she was removed from office after her mishandling of a
major dioxin spill in Times Beach, MO, the cozy relationship between
the EPA and polluting companies under Reagan continued. A set of
leaked EPA documents in 1987 revealed that senior-level EPA officials
were collaborating with pollutant-producing companies in order to
limit public knowledge on the dangers of dioxin and other chemicals3.
There were some minor victories under the Reagan administration for
Superfund --most notably Congress’ successful passing of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)4 in 1986,
which expanded the trust fund to $8.5 billion, increased state
involvement in the cleanup process, and expanded the amount of
ciitzen participation and feedback in making cleanup decisions for
their local sites through the establishment of a more accessible precleanup “public comment”period5. Furthermore, CERCLA proved to be
1
2

Collins 91
Collins 91
3
Collins 96: “According to U.S> District Judge Owen M. Panner, the documents
revealed an agreement, “between the EPA and the industry to suppress, modify, or
delay the results of the joint EPA/industry dioxin study”
4
Collin, 46
5
“SARA Overview” United States Environmental Protection Agency.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/sara.ht
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a more successful form of regulation, as the threat of being held
financially liable for waste greatly cut back the amount of illicit and
secret dumping chemical companies performed.
The biggest blow to CERCLA, however, would come during the
Newt Gingrich lead, Republican dominated congress following the
1994 midterm elections. In 1994, legislation that was proposed to
overhaul and improve superfund died in committee1. When such
efforts were reintroduced in 1995, the Republican controlled congress
refused to renew the pollutant-producers tax that funded the CERCLA
trust fund-- effectively eliminating the eponymous Superfund by
eliminating

its

sole

source

of

funding,

while

simultaneously

undermining the “polluter pays” principle that is so integral to the
nature and goals of CERLA. Efforts to re-invigorate CERCLA further
waned under the Bush Administration, as Bush became the first
President since CERCLA’s passing not to include the “polluters pay” tax
in any of his budget proposals, forcing victims of toxic waste incidents
to pay for the cleanup process2. The Superfund trust fund ran dry by
2003, and while a one-time $600 million stimulus was added to the
superfund in 20093, Superfund site annual completion totals dropped
off by more than 50% following the exhaustion of the trust fund4.
1

Collins 89
Collins 89
3
Broder, John M. “Without Superfund Tax, Stimulus Funds Cleanup”. The New York
Times. April 25, 2009, A16.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/science/earth/26superfund.html?
partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=1&
4
Collins 89
2
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CERCLA, as such, is only a shadow of its former self, which puts the
program in dire straits considering its already neutered beginnings.
How Does CERCLA Work?
The two primary aims of CERCLA are effectively to ensure that
the victims of toxic waste disasters are not forced to carry the burden of
their own cleanup and recovery, and to ensure that whenever possible,
an accountable company will be held responsible for the costs and
efforts of recovery in the case of such disasters3. CERCLA allows for
retroactive accountability --in other words, whether or not a company
improperly disposed of their waste before or after CERCLA, and
whether or not the cleanup was already paid for before a responsible
party was found, the responsible party or parties will be forced to pay
for the costs incurred in recovery. However, in some cases, a
responsible party cannot be determined, or the responsible party
defaults into bankruptcy in the process of paying for the cleanup of
their toxic waste sites.
To this end, the “superfund” was created, in order to ensure victims
were never forced to bear the brunt of the cost of cleanup. A taxpayer
funded trust fund, however, would run counter to this goal, and so the
“polluter pays” principle behind the law was extended to the means by
which it is financed: a tax upon pollutant-producing companies that
“Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980” 42 U.S.C. § 9601 http://www.epw.senate.gov/cercla: For general reference
for the entirety of this section
3
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were prone to cause these toxic-waste incidents, such as chemical and
petroleum companies. By doing so, it would be ensured that no matter
what happened, it would always be the polluting companies that pay
for their own environmental crimes.
The key thing to understand about CERCLA --and what makes it
the most different from not only other environmental laws, but from
most regulatory legislation in U.S. history-- is that CERCLA is a
retrospective statute1 --it is entirely built around response and
reparations to transgressions. Most environmental legislation is
prospective-- it sets guidelines intended to dictate future behavior; if
an entity violates these regulatory guidelines, then they are held subject
to responsive penalties, most likely heavy fines. CERCLA is different
because while it is a responsive measure, and the liability clause can be
seen in one sense as punishment, its primary purpose is not
punishment, but rather to ensure that a vital stage of the process in
responding to a disaster takes place, and that it doesn’t further penalize
those already victimized by the disaster. When combined and properly
enforced alongside other major environmental regulations, it ends up
forming a comprehensive means of regulating and controlling the
adverse effects of industrial chemicals on communities, citizens, and
the ecosystem.

1

Ferrey, Steven. Environmental Law: Examples and Explanations.
Aspen Law and Business, 2001, Second Edition. P333
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The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act1 governs the proper
procedures for handling chemicals and their waste in the production
process, while the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act govern the proper
procedures for discharge and disposal of these toxic wastes. CERCLA,
then, as we see in the diagram on the next page2, exists to govern over
the clean-up process when, for whatever reason, this waste is exposed
to the community due to a party failing the standards of either the
handling or the discharge steps. CERCLA, when properly implemented,
ensures that the life of a chemical in its exposure to human populations
is always a closed cycle.

The other critical element of CERCLA involves the identification,
assessment, and response of the EPA to toxic waste sites. The goal of
this multi-stage process is to effectively identify not only the toxic
waste threat and how to best address it, but to also determine the
responsible parties for this waste, and also to get community input and

1

“Resources Conservation and Recovery Act”, United States Environmental
Protection Agency. http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/lrca.html#About
2
Image on next page taken from Ferrey 333

Borenstein 24
cooperation in the response process in order to ensure that victims’
needs are properly met.

The CERCLA assessment and response process, as it is so colorfully
displayed in the above infographic from the EPA’s official website1, is
most certainly lengthy, yet designed to be comprehensive. The first, the
Preliminary Investigation and Site investigation, are effectively self
explanatory-- the former is background research on the area,
community, and involved parties, along with research on the chemicals
potentially involved, while the latter is an initial on-site visit in order to
identify at the most basic level what happened, and how urgently the
EPA needs to respond. CERCLA allows for two levels of response, both
immediate basic response to ensure toxic waste quarantine and basic
citizen safety, and long-term restoration of toxic waste sites2.

1

2

“The Superfund Process” United States Environmental Protection Agency.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/process.htm. Also for whole section.

“CERCLA Overview”
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With regards to long term response, the next stage in this process
involves determining the degree of urgency involved in implementing a
long-term restoration-- it would be impossible for the EPA to respond
to all incidents as they come up, and so ranking them by priority
becomes necessary. After Initial/Site assessment, a toxic waste site is
then evaluated using the Hazard Ranking System as a means of
determining the urgency with which a site necessitates response. The
HRS is based around evaluating three categories of risk posed by toxic
waste, as it is applied to four means of contamination. The HRS assigns
a numerical risk value to multiple factors, “grouped into three
categories:
○ “likelihood that a site has released or has the potential to
release hazardous substances into the environment;
○ characteristics of the waste (e.g. toxicity and waste quantity);
and
○ people or sensitive environments (targets) affected by the
release.”1
These categories are then assessed on potential contamination to
drinking water through ground water migration; to drinking water,
food, and environments through surface-water migration; to soil
exposure of the toxins to the populations and environments nearby;
and air migration, the potential for harmful exposure to the population
1

“Introduction to the Hazard Ranking System (HRS)”.
Environmental
Protection
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/npl_hrs/hrsint.htm

United

States
Agency.
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(Especially sensitive or at health risk individuals) or environment to
airborne toxins1. After being assessed for all four possible pathways of
exposure, the scores are combined and calculated using a “Root-meansquare”2 equation3.
This aggregate score is then used to determine a site’s placement on
the National Priorities List, which determines the urgency and order of
federal response to Superfund sites. To qualify for placement, a site
must have a score of 28.5 or higher4 From here, the EPA conducts a
remedial investigation of the toxic threats that are present, and a
feasibility study to determine which technologies and methods will
work most effectively in cleaning up the site. At the same time, the
community feedback element becomes pivotal, as the EPA begins to
reach out to the community for feedback on the response. The
following step is the most community-involved, as the EPA then issues
a list of the possible alternatives for response and restoration, and then
seeks public feedback. The window for public feedback on methodology
is a limited period of time, and feedback can be provided both in public

1

See above
See above
3
For further reference,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/hrsres/hrsgm/ch1.pdf, where the equation
is included on the second page, but I am unable to trace the pdf back to the exact
source, so this is not a concrete citation-- it is, however, an official EPA document,
as indicated by the URL.
4
Steinzor, Rena and Clune, Margaret. “The Toll of Superfund Neglect: Toxic Waste
Dumps & Communities at Risk”. Center for American Progress. Center for Progressive
Reform. June 15, 2006.
http://images1.americanprogress.org/il80web20037/cap/superfund_ne
glect.pdf via http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2006/06/15/202
7/the-toll-of-superfund-neglect/
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meetings and in mailed/electronically submitted statements, while the
EPA representatives working at this site try to reach out to the public in
order to solicit this feedback from as many community members as
possible.
From here, the EPA team moves into the Remedial Design and
Remedial Action step-- in layman’s terms, the planning and cleanup
step. This is where the vast majority of the cleanup process takes place,
and is fairly self explanatory. The next step, however -- “Construction
Completion”-- is critical, as it is the present standard of what
constitutes a “finalized” or treated site, when it was not the original
intended standard of CERCLA. Construction Completion occurs either
when all physical construction standards have been met, or the EPA
determines that the site can be deleted from the NPL listing as a
completed project. Note that the “construction completion” stage does
not require meeting standards of toxic waste removal, but rather the
completed construction of all planned physical restorations.
Post-Construction Completion, then, is devoted to long-term action
and maintenance-- mostly, enforcing restrictions and safety measures
regarding exposure to toxins, and continued operation of the
“technologies”1 and systems in place to implement the long-term
cleanup. This step is very vaguely defined, and all mentions of EPA

1

“The Superfund Process” --to reiterate, while many, many sources used for this
investigation go over the whole process, this is the EPA’s official public
explanation of the process.
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participation according to their explanation frame their role as regular
but not necessarily constant maintenance, regulation, and involvement
in the cleanup process. At this point, EPA involvement is much more
limited in terms of active, direct assistance.
The Post-Construction Completion stage’s loose definition and
requirements allow for EPA flexibility in determining the fulfillment of
this stage. When a site passes out of Post-Construction Completion, the
EPA deletes it from the NPL listing, and it is no longer an active
superfund site. There is a public comment period similar to the Record
of Decision in which the public can provide feedback on the EPA’s
stated reasoning for deleting the site off the NPL list, and ending
CERCLA funding. Following this, the EPA will attempt to work with
the community in determining a safe but positive way in which the
affected toxic waste site can be reclaimed and reuse for public benefit,
without posing a risk to the community.
THESIS : CERCLA WAS NEVER PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED
As we’ve established in our history of the act, CERCLA has
had a tumultuous existence, to say the least. Indeed, after an
examination of its political and practical history, it becomes
evident that CERCLA was never properly implemented in the first
place. The circumstances surrounding the passage of the bill at the
end of Carter’s term resulted in exceptionally large concessions,
including the exemption of the Petroleum industry --arguably the
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single-largest toxic waste polluting industry-- from accountability,
while also similarly neglecting to firmly define adequately concrete
completion and ranking standards explicitly due to an urgency in
passing the law. CERCLA’s hurried passage also allowed the
Reagan administration to set a negligent and dangerous precedent
for its implementation. CERCLA was then damaged even further
when its entire end-goals were undermined by the failure of
Congress to renew the pollutants-tax that funded the program,
thereby undermining the “polluters pay” principle inherent to the
law’s design, and thereby eventually eliminating the pool of federal
funding for Superfund cleanup assistance. As a result, countless
Superfund sites on the NPL have waited for years --even decades-for restoration aid, resulting in an astonishing inequity that would
be experienced by thousands of communities in the ten years since
the exhaustion of the Superfund trust fund.
CERCLA

was

harmed

in

its

implementation

by

major

compromises and oversights in its drafting
It is very easy to understand --and similarly justify-- why
the Democrat-controlled congress and the Carter administration
felt the need to rush CERCLA’s passage through before the advent
of the Reagan administration’s small-government agenda. The
successful passage of CERCLA in the early Reagan years would
have been nearly impossible.
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However, the concessions that were made -most critically,
the

aforementioned

exemption

for

petroleum-producing

companies from the liability clause, instead omitting petroleum
from the list of toxins covered under CERCLA- set a very
dangerous precedent that would play a negative role in
determining how the EPA utilized and implemented the law.
Indeed, crude oil’s role as arguably the most dangerous polluter
has been very visibly proven by events such as the 1989 oil spill in
Alaska following the crash of an Exxon-Valdez oil tanker, or the
2010 BP Deepwater Oil Spill in the Gulf Coast-- potentially the two
most costly and destructive corporate environmental disasters in
American history. Moreover, the exemption undermined the very
logic that defined CERCLA-- the oil exemption was included in
order to maintain the clause that included petroleum producing
companies in the polluters-tax that supported the superfund. Yet
by demarcating these oil companies as not responsible for toxic
waste incidents, and still requiring them to pay the polluter’s tax, it
gave detractors of CERCLA the factual grounds to argue that the
tax was unjustly applied to companies that weren’t responsible for
the toxic waste incidents that CERCLA covered-- in essence,
“punishing” these oil companies for a crime they, at least by the
definition of CERCLA, would never commit1. This became one of
the dominant arguments in the senate hearings that ultimately led
1

Burnett, H. Sterling. “Superfund: History of Failure”. National Center for
Policy Analysis. No 198. March 21, 1996. http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba198.pdf. P1
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to the failure to renew the polluter’s tax, and the depletion of the
Superfund1.
CERCLA Was never properly enforced, and a precedent of
negligence and corporate cooperation was established
As established previously, Gorsuch’s tenure as EPA chief
was marked by an actively antagonistic relationship to the office’s
primary role and function. A particularly damning example, of
course, is her management of the catastrophe in Times Beach, MO.
Waste oil released onto the beaches and surrounding land in Times
Beach in 1982 contained two million times the maximum safe
amount of dioxin --one of the most dangerous chemical byproducts
in the world-- as defined by the EPA. For reference, this is 2,000
times the amount of dioxin in the chemical weapon “Agent
Orange”2. After the dioxin contamination in Times Beach was
publicly discovered after more than ten years of exposure, the EPA
stated an intent to investigate the site, but for nine months took no
public action. Shortly after the EPA had finally gotten around to
taking initial toxicity samplings, the nearby Meramec River
flooded, covering literally the entire town under “twenty-five feet

1

Microfilm Y 4.C 73/8: 104-12: “SUPERFUND REAUTHORIZATION HEARING
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE AND
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTH CONGRESS FIRST
SESSION 104-12”
2
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of toxic water and muck”1 that was filled with decades of
improperly disposed waste containing dioxin. The town was
literally inhospitable, and posed a severe danger to every resident
remaining. This flood came at a time close to the revelation that
Burford’s (by this point in time, nee Gorsuch) EPA was filled with
senior officials who had secretly granted cleanup discounts to
corporations liable under superfund, while also manipulating
cleanup timetables in a manner advantageous for Republican
congressional candidates in these regions2. On top of this,
Burford’s budget slashing and political pressuring had resulted in
more than 4,100 EPA employees leaving the agency by the end of
1981-- her first year in the office of EPA chief3. When Congress
investigated the EPA’s mishandling of Times Beach, Reagan gave
Gorsuch/Burford direct orders to use executive privilege to
withhold subpoenaed documents from investigation. After months
of political scandal, tumult, and constitutional debate over the
apparent cover-up, Gorsuch/Burford announced that the EPA
would buy out the entire town of Times Beach for $33 million, to
finance the relocation of its residents4. Times Beach became a
federally

mandated

ghost

town.

Eventually,

in

1983

Burford/Gorsuch resigned from her office along with nine other
Reagan EPA appointees, but the damage was done. Internally, the
1
2
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precedent of inaction and corporate cooperation would maintain in
place for the duration of Reagan’s presidency and the H.W. Bush
administration, to the point where CERCLA-related EPA policies
under Reagan had become codified as internal law. To the outside,
the EPA and Superfund were seen as ineffective, corrupt, and
harmful to the welfare of the American citizenry. There was now a
firmly ingrained internal and external perception of what the EPA
and CERCLA were supposed to do, and they both deviated
significantly from their established intent.

CERCLA’s Defunding Rendered it powerless and invalidated its
entire intent
While the Reagan administration did a great deal to reduce
CERCLA’s efficacy, and the law was in many ways hastily
constructed, it was, by the 1990s, an overall beneficial and
successful program. Under the Bush and Clinton administrations,
Superfund sites successfully recovered increased, and the
percentage and amount of superfund sites paid for by responsible
companies skyrocketed--according to EPA statistics1, by 1995, 75%
of new superfund cleanups were financed by responsible
companies, and 78% of the Superfund trust came from the tax on
1

“The Buck Stops Here: Polluters are Paying for Most Hazardous Waste Cleanups”.
Superfund Today. United States Environmental Protection Agency. June 1996.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/today/pdfs/whopays.pdf P1-3
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polluting industries. The effect becomes startling clear when
exemplified visually1:

However, when congress failed to renew the polluters tax that
financed Superfund, the $3.2 billion available in 1996 was depleted
by 20032, and taxpayers went from carrying 18% of the burden of
cleanup costs to paying for 79% of the total cleanup cost in 2003.
Furthermore, following the bankruptcy of superfund, toxic sites
that did not have a responsible party determined that could
finance the cleanup were forced to rely on federal or state
appropriations for public funding-- a long, complex, and often
unsuccessful process to navigate. Coupled with President George
W. Bush’s aforementioned de-emphasis of superfund projects and
his failure to include increased CERCLA funding in any of his
budget plans, the number of successfully completed NPL sites has

1
2
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nosedived: as the following two1 charts2 on the next two pages
indicate, there has been a precipitous decline in the amount of NPL
sites successfully removed from listing.

Furthermore, the way in which the scarce CERCLA funding is
being spent has changed dramatically, as much more of the
CERCLA budget is going to legal fees and research projects than
ever before, at the expense of actual, direct cleanup efforts.

1

Chart 1 Source: Probst, Katherine N. “Superfund at 25: What Remains to be
done”. Resources for the Future. Fall 2005; Chart created using epa.gov data.
http://www.rff.org/rff/News/Features/Superfund-at-25.cfm
2
Chart 2 source: “Number of National Priorities List (NPL) Site Actions and
Milestones by Fiscal Year”. United States Environmental Protection Agency.
Updated 2013.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtm/nplfy.htm
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Without the funding from the polluting industries tax that was
integral to CERCLA’s “polluter pays” principle, the entire intent of
the law is obliterated. Worse still, without a trust fund to finance
cleanups, any Superfund sites that require public funding are at
the mercy of congressional budgetary appropriation-- in the best
case scenario, the cleanup burden falls on the taxpayers, and in the
worst case, the cleanup simply does not receive the necessary
funding. The Superfund program has been stripped of its
operational autonomy, ruining it in the process.
CERCLA’s defunding has made the Cleanup Process Inherently
Inequitable
As established earlier, the rate at which superfund sites
have been cleaned up has dramatically plummeted since CERCLA’s
defunding. As a result, superfund sites lower on the NPL list have
been left neglected for years at a time. By 2006, out of 1,375 sites
on the NPL list, CERCLA had only restored 294-- a mere 21%1. The
nature of the disparity is made all that much more clear when this
data is taken in consideration with the nature of the CERCLA
cleanup process: only NPL sites receive even basic federal support
for cleanup efforts, while the standard for making the NPL
requires a fairly high degree of toxic waste risk. A site that does not
make the NPL, as such, is by no means necessarily a “Safe” site.
1
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The problem has not improved much in the past few years, either.
A look at the current state of superfund sites makes it clear that the
EPA is struggling to keep up1:

To put those numbers into perspective: 2,252 potential
superfund sites are still in need of further evaluation at this
moment in time, and there are 1,730 sites already on the NPL.
Compare that by referring to the previous chart of NPL milestones
on page 35, to get an idea what a safe estimate on the number of
site completions and additions we can expect this year, using the
data for 2011, as it is the most complete recent dataset. Out of
those 2,252 sites in need of further assessment to determine NPL
status, only 35 were proposed to be added to the NPL, and only 25
were finalized for addition. Meanwhile, as far as successful
cleanups go only 7 sites were deleted from the NPL registry to
1

Chart from: “Status of Site Assessment Inventory”. United States Environmental
Protection Agency. As of April 7, 2013.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/npl_hrs/AttachD.htm
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signify the end of CERCLA restoration. 3 more were partially
completed. If we go by the standard of “Construction complete” as
an acceptable standard of forward progress for restoration efforts,
then a whopping 22 sites met this milestone in 2011. If the rate at
which NPL sites were added more closely reflected the number of
NPL sites in total, this would be a fairly solid rate of completion.
However, to reiterate: by the EPA’s own numbers, that is 22 out of
1,730 sites on the NPL list in need of cleanup. If we limited that
number to only finalized sites on the NPL, that would still leave
1,311 sites in need of cleanup1. The EPA’s lack of CERCLA funding
and resources has left it completely unable to meet an ever
mounting need to assist in cleanup efforts.
Meanwhile, the cleanup process for these sites is already a
lengthy one, but the backlog of response and the lack of Superfund
funding available has resulted in the wait for cleanup taking
decades in some regions. Consider the case of Woburn, MA, home
to the Industri-Plex site, a site that was finalized on the NPL in
1983 after arsenic and other toxins were found at dangerously high
levels in the soil. The reclamation plan for the Woburn site wasn’t
finalized until 2006, and the construction process has yet to even

1

“National Priorities List (NPL)”. United States Environmental Protection
Agency. As of April 22, 2013.
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/index.htm
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formally begin1. Congress only appropriated cleanup funding to the
Industri-Plex site in February of this year2.
Furthermore, the CERCLA cleanup process is by no means
unobtrusive, and can sometimes potentially cause further exposure
to toxins in the community around a superfund site. This poses an
exceptionally large problem for superfund sites located within
urban environments. A recent example comes in the EPA’s
planned Superfund project in Brooklyn, NY’s Gowanus Canal3. The
Gowanus Canal runs along several of Brooklyn’s most densely
populated neighborhoods of a wide variety of socioeconomic and
ethnic demographics. However, the neighborhood most affected by
toxic waste disposal into the Gowanus is Red Hook, which poses an
interesting problem as the Red Hook neighborhood, while
historically

predominantly

African-American,

has

become

increasingly gentrified in the past decade. However, it is still
straddling the line between gentrification, and the area is still
dense with pollutant-emitting industries. One major aspect of the
NPL plan for Gowanus involves the creation of a large sewage
storage container for containing the removed sewage; this sewage
1

“Superfund Site Progress Profile INDUSTRI-PLEX”. United States Environmental
Protection Agency. Updated May 13, 2013.
http://cumulis.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0100580
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Burnham-Snyder, Eben. “Markey Praises Payment for Woburn Industri-Plex
Superfund Site”. Congressman Ed Markey. Feb 27, 2013.
http://markey.house.gov/press-release/markey-praises-payment-woburn
-industri-plex-superfund-site
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“Superfund Site Progress Profile GOWANUS CANAL”. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Updated May 13, 2013.
http://cfpub.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/csitinfo.cfm?id=0206222
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storage unit would be constructed and located in Red Hook1. The
process of removing and storing this sewage could potentially
release the toxins from the sewage into the air of a neighborhood
that is already at high risk for asthma due to the high industrial
presence there. Furthermore, the storage facility is planned to be
located near a prominent park. As a result, Red Hook residents
have voiced their discontent and protest during the recently ended
Public Comment period, calling for the EPA to embrace a more
costly plan of shipping the waste to a different state for storage. In
either case, the sludge dredging and cleanup process isn’t expected
to start until 2015, and will not finish until 2020, at the expected
earliest.
Not only do cities face the problem of how to cleanup sites in
densely populated areas, they also face the crisis of storage. Due to
the density of an area like Brooklyn, storage is difficult, and any
inevitable leakage or possible catastrophe with stored waste will
have its effects all that much more amplified. If the waste is stored
in a city, it will most likely be stored in a lower socioeconomic area,
or an area with a high industrial presence-- two categories that are
often one in the same, and are also the two types of neighborhoods
already at the most risk of toxic waste exposure, along with already
1

Berger, Joseph. “Neighbors Resist a Plan to Clean a Toxic Canal”.
The New York Times, May 6, 2013, Section A17.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/nyregion/epa-plan-to-clean-up-g
owanus-canal-meets-local-resistance.html
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being subject to an increased risk of respiratory and health
problems due to the nature of the urban built environment.
Furthermore, shipping the waste off for disposal elsewhere
poses its own set of ethical problems. Is it fair to make another
community put itself at risk to store this waste? Alternatively, is it
right to store this waste in isolated areas, where it still does
damage to the ecosystem? Unfortunately, the latter is more likely
the very slightly lesser of the two evils in the short term, but
isolated areas devoted to storing dangerous waste --such as the
Yucca Mountain Nuclear waste storage repository-- will, over time,
amass an increasingly large amount of stored waste, thereby
exponentially raising the potential damage done by an accidental
leak or breach. Indeed, the very act of simply storing the waste
elsewhere is potentially unethical due to the fact that storing large
quantities of toxic waste poses a potential risk for the storage unit
to fail in some way, and for a similar, more intensified version of
repeating the very disaster the cleanup effort tried to address.
Most

ethically

unsettling,

however,

is

the

potential

disadvantage certain regions or demographics have in recieving
NPL and Superfund attention. Even before CERCLA’s defunding, a
study of NPL data as of 1989 found that, “the number of NPL sites
in counties highly represented by the poor, unemployed, and
nonwhites is below the national average. (The number of NPL sites
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where the percentages of the poor and racial minorities are below
the average necessarily exceeds the national average.) Further,
significantly more NPL sites are located where median housing
values are higher than the national average for counties.”1
Now, it should be made clear: just because a site is not on the
NPL list does not mean it does not require urgent attention and
cleanup. As seen earlier, there are thousands of sites in need of
further assessment, and the level of toxic waste risk required for
NPL listing is quite high. Furthermore, because of the EPA’s
limited resources, it takes years for a toxic waste site to receive this
assessment. As such, it is entirely possible that more affluent and
Caucasian communities are at a significant advantage for receiving
assessment attention and NPL listing, as members of these
communities have more influence --socially, politically, and
financially speaking-- to lead public efforts calling for EPA
assessment and intervention. As Love Canal proved, capturing
widespread public attention to a crisis significantly expedites the
timetable of government response.
However, it is also worth considering the fact that out of
decades of toxic waste catastrophes --particularly in industrialdense, lower income and minority-prominent communities-- the

1

Hird, John A., “Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund.”
Journal of Political Analysis and Management, Volume 12: Issue 2. 1993,
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galvanizing event that led to public and governmental support for
regulatory reform involved a toxic waste spill in an affluent,
suburban, and predominantly white community. To this end, it
becomes clear that the NPL process, due to the limited ability of
EPA investigators to visit toxic waste sites in a timely manner, is
inherently

biased

towards

more

affluent

and

Caucasian

communities, if only because of their greater media visibility,
increased influence, and greater financial resources at their
disposal to help bring attention to their toxic waste sites.
Furthermore, poorer communities often have lower HS graduation
rates, and often have lower rates of English fluency and literacy as
well, posing a severe obstacle to garnering awareness and EPA
attention for these populations.
Even in spite of the inherent bias of the NPL system towards
socioeconomically

disadvantaged

communities,

the

NPL

assessment process still largely hinges around severity-- any site
on the NPL list poses a severe toxic risk to its community. This
makes it all the more disturbing that a 2008 study using 2008 NPL
site locations and 2000 U.S. census data found that of 12,870,400
people living within one mile of an NPL site, 4,189,590 of them are
living 200% below the poverty level1. Approximately a third of all
1
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U.S. citizens who are put at increased risk of toxic waste exposure
are living in severe destitution. It is damningly clear that due to the
increased presence of industrial facilities in predominantly lowerincome communities, these already disadvantaged citizens are put
at a significantly higher risk of being affected by a severe, NPLworthy toxic waste incident. In fact, these statistics only serve to
exacerbate the previous data regarding NPL assessment and
selection biases, as in spite of those biases towards priority
assessment and cleanup efforts in more affluent communities, a
massive plurality of those affected by NPL sites are severely
destitute. Furthermore, while it is difficult to find contemporary
data regarding the rates of NPL site approval by race and affluence
after de-funding of CERCLA, an examination of data in this study
shows that the vast majority of residents living in a 1 mile radius of
these established NPL sites are white1, regardless of affluence.
Considering that these NPL sites are largely located in poor
neighborhoods, and also considering the disproportionately high
rates of poverty found in predominantly minority communities, it
becomes evident that there is a strong case for a selection bias in
favor of white neighborhoods when it comes to NPL evaluation,
meaning that poor minority communities are at equal risk of being
affected by a toxic waste incident, but it is far more likely that their
1

Golden, P9: Of those within a mile of an NPL site, 2,581,900 are
Hispanic, and 1,513,350 are African American. 8,855,930 are white.
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disasters will go years, even decades without assessment, if at all.
This ingrained practice of EPA bias and neglect becomes a
nightmarish proposition when compared with the Government
Accountability Office’s assessment that there are, “between
150,000 and 500,000 toxic sites that remain completely
unaddressed by CERCLA.”1 There is a clear cause for concern over
an implicit racial and socioeconomic bias in the NPL selection and
CERCLA reclamation process, and the lack of readily available
research on the matter only makes this disparity worse. It is
indicative of a regulatory culture that takes a de facto permissive
stance towards industrial negligence in poorer and predominantly
minority neighborhoods, as the data clearly indicates there is a
good chance that the EPA will never get around to investigating
these locales.
When it is considered that there is a bias against certain
population demographics in the NPL selection process, that the
cleanup process is difficult and potentially equally damaging, and
that often CERCLA cleanup efforts take decades to run to
completion, there are already a myriad of ethical complications
with CERCLA’s current implementation, in spite of the fact that
the vast majority of them are not endemic to the explicit written
structure of the law. The fact, then, that CERCLA’s defunding has
gridlocked and impeded the assessment and cleanup process
1
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exponentially makes such inherent biases of neglect absolutely
criminal.
SOLUTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
CERCLA was already a flawed law due to the compromises and
oversights it made in order to expedite its passage under the term
of a friendly Congress and Presidency. However, its problems were
only exacerbated

by

its initial

improper and inadequate

implementation, and by its crippling de-funding at the hands of
Congress. As a result, and already ethically problematic solution to
the problem of toxic waste dumps becomes a nightmare, as the
EPA lacks the funding to support cleanup efforts at sites that need
them the most: the sites where there is no company to hold
accountable for the cleanup.
CERCLA,

when

it

works,

can

do

good

things;

the

neighborhoods that do receive cleanup attention greatly benefit
from it, and CERCLA’s flexible criteria for cleanup solutions leaves
room for the use of innovative and groundbreaking advances in
methods and technology for cleaning up toxic waste. However, the
cases in which it has been properly implemented are the exception,
due simply to the fact that the CERCLA process is so infrequently
carried out to completion in a timely and effective fashion. When
CERCLA had non-conditional federal funding to work with, it was
limited by internal EPA and Executive resistance; once it
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exhausted its trust fund, CERCLA simply lacked the resources to
be effective on a large and necessary scale.
It becomes clear that CERCLA is in need of dramatic reform,
and the EPA is in dire need of increased operative ability. While it
may seem like an obvious and basic solution, it must be noted that
any improvement to the dire state of unaddressed toxic waste sites
must be first addressed by re-implementing the “polluters pay” tax
that was so integral to providing the EPA its operative autonomy in
enforcing CERCLA, while at the same time defining the very
purpose of the law: to avoid the further victimization of those
already affected by toxic waste sites.
The next step, then, is to reform CERCLA itself, by adding
petroleum to the list of toxins for which industries are legally
liable, and by establishing firm timetables on the Preliminary
Assessment/Site Inspection and on the NPL Listing process at the
bare minimum, while also holding EPA employees involved in the
NPL process accountable for making consistent and timely process
in every stage of the cleanup effort. Further, a revised CERCLA
should have stronger standards regarding how much CERCLA
funding is actually used on the cleanup effort, and it should place
the burden of legal costs on the responsible organization as well, in
order to reduce drawn-out legal battles made by companies
responsible for toxic waste incidents. Of course, in order to ensure
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this proper implementation, it is necessary to significantly increase
the EPA’s federal funding and resources.
Furthermore, in order to address the inequity of assessment
attention in the NPL process, the EPA should consider
implementing educational programs in lower-income and minority
communities, in order to inform them about how they can
effectively pursue EPA attention for toxic waste issues in their
neighborhood. Of course, the NPL’s issue of bias will not be
completely solved by this, as this racial and socioeconomic inequity
is endemic of American society as a whole.
To further consider the impracticality of these solutions, it
needs to be noted that with the massive number of unaddressed
toxic waste sites, and with the invariable truth that these sites will
continue to emerge at a staggeringly high rate for the foreseeable
future without behavioral change, it becomes clear that even if the
EPA had levels of funding approaching that of the Department of
Defense, it still might lack the resources to address all these toxic
waste sites with the urgency they require. It is all that much worse,
as such, when upon considering the current economic climate of
the present and the realities of political funding biases, it becomes
clear that it is impossible for the EPA to get the resources and
funding it needs to address cleanup sites at the rate it needs to,
even if the “polluters pay” tax was reinstated.
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It becomes clear, then, that in the immediacy, we can only hope
to reform CERCLA in order to give the EPA more functional ability
with the hopes that it will improve the number of toxic waste sites
that do receive necessary attention, even if the task of keeping pace
with the rate at which these sites appear has grown to be wholly
Sisyphean. Furthermore, our long term hope rests on our ability to
strengthen prospective and preventative industrial regulations on
waste handling, and on our ability to bring about a cultural and
behavioral shift in the way we deal with waste and industrial
emissions. Without such a seismic change in American society’s
relationship with toxin-producing industries and institutions, the
rate at which Superfund sites appear will continue to be
staggeringly high, and will only get worse with time. Indeed, even
with a cultural shift, toxic waste incidents will continue to
inevitably occur at a high incidence, if caused by nothing else but
the

negligence

and

infrastructural

establishments

of

our

predecessors and present contemporaries.
As such, the situation is quite dire for the health of CERCLA,
and even worse for the environmental health of United States, but
a reformed Superfund Act does have the potential to make a more
significant contribution to the cleanup process, provided the EPA
commits itself to the mission of its proper implementation, and
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Congress properly reforms the law to reinstate the crucial
“polluters pay” tax that makes CERCLA’s very mission possible.
Major improvements and advancements in the way America
handles toxic waste disposal will not appear overnight, but every
small step forward makes a critical difference, and there is no
clearer step to take then finally giving CERCLA its due reform and
proper implementation. A society is only as meritorious as it is
willing to engage in the hopelessly asymptotic struggle against its
own endemic wrongdoings. Until we start to change our laws, our
behavior, and our awareness of our own impact on the world
around us, our swords will remain in our sheathes, and we will
bear passive witness to the global existential threat posed by our
negligence.
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